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Calming Troubled Waters: Local Solutions1 
John R. Nolon 
 
Abstract 
 
In 1861, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted the Absolute Use Rule to govern groundwater, 
essentially allowing landowners its unencumbered use. The opinion noted that the 
behavior of subterranean water was “occult and mysterious” and that it was beyond the 
competence of judges to determine its appropriate use. The Ohio court reversed course 
in 1984 and adopted the Reasonable Use Rule. By then, scientific knowledge had 
advanced to the point that the interconnected movement of water was more readily 
discoverable. The court noted that a primary goal of water law should be to conform to 
hydrologic fact. This Article explores the advance of scientific knowledge related to water 
pollution, which reveals the clear relationship between land use and water quality. It 
examines the Clean Water Act and concludes that, despite advances in scientific 
knowledge, federal law does not conform to scientific fact but remains mysteriously 
incapable of addressing much of the nation’s severe water pollution. Non-navigable 
waters, groundwater, and nonpoint sources, with minor exceptions, all fall outside the 
Clean Water Act’s regulatory scope, as currently interpreted.  
 
State governments, however, may use their reserved police powers to protect natural 
resources, including watersheds. Most state legislatures have delegated broad power to 
local governments to mitigate water pollution through the adoption of land use plans, 
zoning laws, and land use and public nuisance regulations. The Article describes a host 
of local government gap-filling strategies that protect water quality and explores a number 
of intermunicipal and intergovernmental collaborations that defy the many critics who 
warn against relying on localism to solve natural resource problems. It analyzes the 
principle of subsidiarity, which holds that responsibility for dealing with problems should 
be delegated to the most decentralized institution capable of addressing them. There is 
general agreement among most critics that, despite their limitations, local governments 
must play a key role in resource conservation, but that they need assistance. To 
accommodate the diversity of situations and the need for flexibility in approach, the Article 
constructs, explains, and recommends the Principle of Collaborative Subsidiarity as a 
strategic path for rectifying the fragmented nature of the nation’s system of water law.  
 
 
I. Introduction   
 
A. A Watershed Moment 
                                                 
1 John R. Nolon is Distinguished Professor and Counsel to the Land Use Law Center at the Elisabeth 
Haub School of Law at Pace University.  He is indebted to the fifteen students who worked on his 
Calming Troubled Waters project, particularly to Haley Brescia who served as his research assistant. Ms. 
Brescia is the President of the Environmental Law Society at the Haub School of Law.  Grants to support 
the work of these students from the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, the Haub School of Law, 
and Vermont Law School are gratefully acknowledged. 
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The event was a local land use leadership training program in the upstate New York 
Sawkill Watershed on controlling the alarming risks of water pollution. Local land use 
board members and elected officials gathered to learn how to prevent public health and 
ecosystem harms caused by the effects of land use and development on local water 
quality.2 After we covered the local land use strategies suitable to the task, we asked for 
questions. Margaret, a local planning board chair, whose family member had been 
diagnosed with cancer attributed to drinking contaminated water, raised her hand.  She 
asked us to explain this country’s water law system and why, despite federal and state 
environmental laws, she and her fellow local leaders had to use their municipal land use 
authority to prevent water pollution. This seemingly simple question, which we were 
unable to answer to her satisfaction, led to the Land Use Law Center’s two-year water 
law project and was the impetus for this Article.3  
 
Margaret’s question cuts through all of the nuanced jurisprudential and ideological 
rhetoric and analysis that characterizes so many law school water law colloquia and legal 
scholarship. It goes directly to the heart of the issue. If we can’t explain clearly how the 
legal system actually works and how to solve present problems, then we lose credibility 
in discussions in city halls, courtrooms, and the classroom. Instead of expressing an 
opinion about a pending federal rule change or a U.S. Supreme Court decision regarding 
some nuance of federal water law, Margaret’s question requires that we explain water 
law so she can decide what to do to address her community’s water problem. Should she 
lobby Congress, EPA, the state legislature, one or more state agencies, or her city council 
or town board?  If the legal system it is not logical, we need to explain why and offer some 
solutions that can be employed now for Margaret, her family, and her watershed.  
 
 
B. The “Occult” Origins of Water Law 
 
In 1861, the Ohio Supreme Court decided Frazier v. Brown in which it adopted the 
Absolute Use Rule of groundwater use.4  The doctrine stood until 1984, when, in Cline v. 
American Aggregates, the court reversed course and adopted the Restatement’s 
Reasonable Use Rule.5 The Frazier court held that “…the law recognizes no correlative 
rights in respect to underground waters percolating, oozing or filtrating through the 
earth….Because the existence, origin, movement and course of such waters, and the 
causes which govern and direct their movement are so secret, occult and concealed, any 
                                                 
2 The Land Use Law Center regularly conducts multi-day Land Use Leadership Training Programs for 
local officials from the 250 municipalities in the Hudson River Valley. Haub students conduct research on 
the land use issues that the leaders raise in these training initiatives.  
3 This Article was developed by the author in conjunction with delivering the 15th Annual Distinguished 
Norman Williams Lecture at Vermont Law School in the spring of 2019. Among many of his 
accomplishments, Professor Williams maintained a two-volume casebook on American Land Planning Law. 
The final sentence of his Introduction to the casebook reads as follows: “If experience in this field teaches 
anything, it suggests that not all wisdom is derived from reported appellate opinions. Life in the real world 
is quite different, and those facets which are really important in understanding the actual problem often do 
not filter through the legal process. In a word, read, mark, and inwardly ponder these materials – but don’t 
believe a word of it.” 
4 Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294 (1861). 
5 Cline v. Am. Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 1984). 
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attempt to administer a set of legal rules in respect to them would be involved in hopeless 
uncertainty, and would be, therefore, practically impossible.”6 This rendered neighbors 
who share the use of a groundwater aquifer nearly impotent; the unreasonable-use of 
their shared resource was damnum sine injuria: a wrong without a remedy. 
 
In Cline, the court reversed course, noting that “…a primary goal of water law should be 
that the legal system conforms to hydrologic fact. Scientific knowledge in the field of 
hydrology has advanced in the past decade to the point that water tables and sources are 
more readily discoverable. With notable exceptions, it is now possible for land use 
professionals to trace the impact of pumping groundwater to serve one parcel on the 
quality and quality of groundwater underlying neighboring properties. Thus, liability can 
now be fairly adjudicated with these advances which were solely lacking when this court 
decided Frazier more than a century ago.”7 
 
What science now reveals is the extraordinary close relationship between land use and 
development and the quality of water and health of watersheds. Part II of this Article 
explores the advance of scientific knowledge related to water pollution and, based on that 
knowledge, describes the clear relationship between land use and water pollution. Land 
development increases impervious surface area, compacts soils, removes vegetation, 
and alters the flow of water above and below ground.  If not carefully engineered, 
development can severely diminish the quality of water.  Uncontrolled development 
increases the volume and rapidity of stormwater runoff, decreases infiltration, 
exacerbates flooding, and causes soil erosion and sedimentation. Runoff moving across 
developed surfaces picks up pollutants and sediments and carries them, unfiltered, into 
surface waters. We call this non-point source pollution (NPS), defined as “runoff, 
precipitation, atmospheric deposition, drainage, seepage, or hydrologic modification.”8 It 
comes from many diffuse sources and is considered the leading source of domestic water 
quality problems. State governments report that 40% of all their impaired waters are 
contaminated solely by NPS.9   
 
C. Fragmentation of Water Law: Troubled Waters 
Part III reveals the unfortunate fact that federal law, despite these advances in scientific 
knowledge does not conform to hydrologic fact but remains “occult,” that is, mysterious 
and of limited help to local officials searching for practical solutions for their water 
problems. It goes on to sketch the plenary powers of state governments to use their 
reserved police powers to protect natural resources, such as watersheds, and the 
                                                 
6 Frazier, 12 Ohio St. at 311; See also Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49, 53 (1855), where the court held that 
it is best to allow groundwater to be “enjoyed absolutely by the owner of the land,” recognized no 
correlative right to groundwater between adjoining proprietors of land and refused to regulate it due to 
practical uncertainties. 
7 Cline, 474 N.E.2d at 328. 
8 Basic Information about Nonpoint Source (NPS) Pollution, EPA (2018), https://www.epa.gov/nps/basic-
information-about-nonpoint-source-nps-pollution (last visited Dec 29, 2018). 
9 Introduction to the Clean Water Act, U.S. EPA WATERSHED ACAD. WEB. 
https://cfpub.epa.gov/watertrain/moduleFrame.cfm?parent_object_id=2788 (last visited Dec 29, 2018). 
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delegation of that power to local governments through the authority to adopt land use 
plans, zoning laws, and land use regulations.  
 
The drinking water serving most homes in Margaret’s community comes from 
groundwater wells and much of the surface water pollution in her community is due to 
non-point source pollution, caused by surrounding development and land uses.  She was 
surprised to learn that the Clean Water Act (CWA) effectively regulates neither of these. 
It is limited in its reach. Non-navigable waters,10 groundwater,11 and nonpoint sources12 
all fall outside the statute’s regulatory scope. Federal authority can therefore only go so 
far, leaving many gaps to be filled by the states and the municipalities to which they 
delegate power to regulate land use. State and local regulations can go beyond the limits 
of the CWA,13  reaching isolated wetlands and intrastate waters,14 groundwater, and the 
sources of non-point source pollution.15  
 
Because of statutory, regulatory, and constitutional disconnections, the waters of the 
United States are troubled. Calming them, and answering Margaret’s question, may 
depend on where one stands and where one observes the water law system. An apt 
metaphor is provided by Benjamin Franklin who described what happened when he 
dropped a cruet of oil on the rough waters of Clapham pond and watched “it spread itself 
with surprising swiftness upon the surface; but the effect of smoothing the waves was not 
produced; for I had applied it first on the leeward side of the pond, where the waves were 
largest, and the wind drove my oil back upon the shore.  I then went to the windward side 
where they [the waves] began to form; and the oil, though not more than a teaspoonful, 
produced an instant calm over a space of several yards square, which spread amazingly 
and extended itself gradually till it reached the lee side, making all that quarter of the 
pond, perhaps half an acre, as smooth as a looking glass.16  
                                                 
10 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012) (prohibiting “the discharge of any pollutant by any person”); id. § 1362(12) 
(defining discharge as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source”). 
11 See 40 CFR Part 230.3(o)(2) (2015) (exempting groundwater from the definition of waters of the United 
States); ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS & EPA, EPA-HQ-OW-2018-0149, REVISED DEFINITION OF “WATERS OF 
THE UNITED STATES, REVISED DEFINITION OF “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” 215 (Dec. 11, 2018) 
[hereinafter REVISED DEFINITION OF “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES”], 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-12/documents/wotus_2040-af75_nprm_frn_2018-12-
11_prepublication2_1.pdf, (exempting groundwater from the pre-proposal redefinition of waters of the 
United States); see also Washington Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Min. Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 990 (E.D. 
Wash. 1994) (finding that courts generally agree that the CWA “do[es] not included ‘isolated/nontributary 
groundwater’” but that courts are split on “whether tributary groundwater . . . is subject to CWA 
regulation”). 
12 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (prohibiting “the discharge of any pollutant by any person”); id. § 1362(12) 
(defining discharge as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source”). 
13 See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994) (“[R]egulation of land use [is] a 
function traditionally performed by local governments.”) 
14 See Paul Edward Svensson, The Supreme Court's New Federalism: The Authority of the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers Does Not Extend Over Isolated Intrastate Wetlands Under the Migratory Bird Rule, 19 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 165, 194 (2001) (“[O]nly a state possesses the authority to regulate land and water 
use in isolated, intrastate wetlands.”). 
15 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (2012). 
16 CHARLES TANFORD, BEN FRANKLIN STILLED THE WAVES: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF POURING OIL ON WATER 
WITH REFLECTIONS ON THE UPS AND DOWNS OF SCIENTIFIC LIFE IN GENERAL 71 (1989) 
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This Article stands on the windward side of the waters, where the troubles begin.  That is 
to say, it observes the problems where they first occur, on the lands around the local 
ponds, lakes, streams, wetlands, and rivers, and above groundwater aquifers.  Water 
pollution is a local phenomenon; it affects local people and engages, as if by instinct, local 
legal powers. It is critical that we understand the authority that resides in this windward 
space and to learn how to use it collaboratively to fill the significant gaps in state and 
federal water law.  
 
D. Local Solutions 
In Part IV, the Article describes a host of local government gap-filling strategies that 
protect water quality and promote water conservation. These include aquifer and 
watershed overlay zoning, open space provisions in land use plans, urban growth 
boundaries, designated priority areas for growth, designated water conservation areas, 
creation of rain gardens and sedimentation ponds, cluster development requirements to 
avoid development in vulnerable watershed areas, sedimentation controls of surface 
mining operations, special limitations on water use in subdivisions that exceed recharge 
levels,  density bonuses for water conserving features in residences, aquifer protection 
districts, required wetland creation, use of pervious cover and detention ponds, adoption 
of EcoDistricts with provisions that lower per capita water consumption, use of a green 
building checklist including water conservation measures, adoption of tree preservation 
ordinances and Urban Tree Canopy goals, mandatory well testing provisions, stormwater 
management fees with incentives to reduce impervious coverage, local water 
conservation and permitting laws, and public nuisance laws.   
 
These laws are adopted by local governments to fit the unique circumstances of each 
one, demonstrating the difficulty that a remote state or federal legislature might have in 
legislating to project water quality and other public values. Many of the local solutions 
described in Part IV are not within the regulatory authority of the federal government and 
beyond the reach of the power that state legislatures have given their state water, health, 
and environmental conservation agencies.  
 
 
 
E. Collaborative Subsidiarity  
Critics of delegating land use authority to towns, villages, and cities cite several 
deficiencies in relying on such a parochial system of law. They push back against the 
principle of subsidiarity, the notion “which holds that responsibility for dealing with a 
problem should be delegated to the most decentralized institution capable of handling 
that problem.”17 The list of concerns includes the limited geographical jurisdiction of 
                                                 
17 ROBERT ELLICKSON, LOSING GROUND: A NATION ON EDGE 275 (John R. Nolon & Daniel B. Rodriguez 
eds., 2007); see also Graham R. Marshall, Nesting, Subsidiarity, and Community-based Environmental 
Governance Beyond the Local Level, 2 INT’L JOURNAL OF THE COMMONS 75, 80 (2008) (“Although various 
definitions of this principle exist, they generally share in common the implication that any particular task 
should be decentralized to the lowest level of governance with the capacity to conduct it satisfactorily. …. 
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municipal governments,18 their lack of technical capacity, inadequate financial resources, 
and resistance to mandates from state and federal agencies.19  Anti-localist scholars point 
to numerous additional reasons why untethered local control of land use is a bad idea.  
They cite a “race to the bottom” mentality, NIMBYism, inadequate information, and 
insufficient funding.20 
 
Part V identifies and discusses several approaches to addressing these local deficiencies 
and how states, often, and federal agencies, less frequently, act to help overcome local 
barriers to effective action.21 They include the provision of technical assistance, data, and 
model laws; state mandated environmental impact review; authority to collaborate with 
neighboring municipalities; intergovernmental watershed planning; integration of small 
water providers and waste water systems; and the creation of flexible regional networks. 
In Part VI, the Article concludes with an analysis of the many theorists who support 
grassroots efforts to solve land use problems.22  The literature is filled with theories such 
as the subsidiarity principle, complex adaptive systems, diffusion of innovation, and 
flexible regional networks, among others. The Part continues with a second look at, and 
further analysis of, the articles that are critical of reliance on local governments. The critics 
concede that local governments need to be involved in governmental systems to protect 
natural resources, even if such structures are to be assisted, initiated, or controlled by 
regional, state, or federal actors. There is disagreement among them as to which higher 
level of government should be the relevant actor. Some suggest state initiatives under a 
subfederal approach, others discuss federal-local structures with local officials acting as 
federal agents, some point to voluntary compacts with neighboring communities, and still 
others propose strong regional bodies. 
 
This Article concludes that there is general agreement among many scholars that local 
governments must play a key role in land use regulation, but that municipal governments 
need assistance and that collaborative structures should be created where inter-
jurisdictional issues are involved. The Article ends by proposing that the precise 
partnership needed depends on the problem being addressed, the circumstances of the 
situation, and the prevailing political culture.  To accommodate the diversity of situations 
                                                 
This conviction implied that a higher level of organization should refrain from undertaking tasks that could 
be performed just as well by a grouping closer to the individual”). 
18 See Golden v. Planning Bd. of the Town of Ramapo. 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972). The state's 
highest court stated that New York's "current zoning enabling legislation is burdened by the 
largely antiquated notion which deigns that the regulation of land use and development is 
uniquely a function of local government." ld. at 299. The court referenced criticisms of 
community autonomy finding that local land use control suffers from "pronounced insularism" 
and produces "distortions in metropolitan growth patterns." Id. It also noted that local control 
"crippl[es] efforts toward regional and State-wide problem solving, be it pollution, decent 
housing, or public transportation." Id. 
19 See Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the "New Federalism": Devolution, 
Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REV. 97, 174-75 (1996) (arguing that local regulations will often 
keep only their local interest in mind when federal regulation does not exist or apply). 
20 See infra notes 306-318 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra Part V, for citations to the mechanisms mentioned in this paragraph. 
22 See infra Part VI for citations to these theories. 
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and the need for flexibility in approach, it constructs, explains, and recommends that 
strategists embrace the Principle of Collaborative Subsidiarity.  
 
